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Market participants continue to demand greater transparency from boards of directors, yet little is 
known about the effect of increased transparency on board member decisions.  We provide initial 
evidence that increased transparency via disclosure can license board members to make biased 
decisions that they may otherwise not make in the absence of disclosure.  We find no evidence 
that increasing the level of disclosure (disclosure to the auditor versus disclosure to the auditor 
and public) had an impact beyond a base level of disclosure.  An important implication of these 
findings, relevant to current projects at both the PCAOB and the SEC, is that increased 
transparency via disclosure of board member decisions may result in the unintended consequence 
of greater bias in financial reporting. The knowledge gained form this study may help to improve 




1.  Introduction 
 Market participants continue to request more transparency related to financial reporting 
and governance because it is difficult to hold management and the board of directors accountable 
without transparency. While accounting researchers have devoted considerable time and 
attention to understanding the effects of increased transparency via financial disclosures related 
to auditor and investor behavior, little is known about whether requiring disclosures also affects 
governance decisions.1  In this study, we examine the effect of transparency via financial 
disclosure on board members’ decision-making. More specifically, we experimentally examine 
whether the act of disclosing board member decisions may provide these directors with a moral 
license2 that biases their decisions. 
It is important to examine the decisions of members of the board of directors and the 
disclosures emanating from these leaders.  The board is a key governance mechanism for 
monitoring management to ensure that management acts in the interest of the firm’s stakeholders 
(Fama 1980; Fama and Jensen 1983), and the foundation of any governance structure is 
disclosure and transparency (Fung 2014). Indeed, financial markets continue to demand 
increased transparency and accountability as evidenced by the SEC’s recent rule on enhanced 
disclosure requirements about firms’ corporate governance that was adopted to improve 
disclosure, transparency, and accountability of officers and directors to their stakeholders (SEC 
2009). “In recent years, investors, regulators and other stakeholders have taken a closer look at 
the important role of boards — and audit committees in particular — in supporting high-quality 
                                                          
1 For example, when making a choice coupled with disclosure, auditors alter their choices in a manner that produces 
less reliable information (Griffin 2014).  In addition, users of financial information sometimes fail to use disclosures 
to punish opportunistic behavior even when it is transparently disclosed (Hirst et al. 2003; Koonce et al. 2010). 
2 A moral license is the often-unconscious feeling that a seemingly unbiased act licenses a different biased act 
without discrediting the actor. 
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financial reporting and have sought greater transparency around the audit and oversight of 
financial reporting (EY 2017).” According to a recent EY study, governance-related 
transparency has been steadily increasing over the past few years and will likely continue to 
increase as the PCAOB and SEC continue to advance projects that involve new disclosure 
requirement revisions (SEC 2009; PCAOB 2011; EY 2017). In the meantime, companies are 
taking proactive steps to respond to stakeholder requests by providing enhanced disclosures 
around audit committee activities (EY 2017). 
Although transparency in decision-making can provide benefits to market participants 
(e.g., accountability and information), moral licensing theory suggests that there may also be 
notable drawbacks – transparency could influence the decision-making itself.  A significant body 
of literature has documented licensing effects in various contexts including advice giving, 
consumer behavior, racism, and sexism (Cain et al. 2005; Cain et al. 2010; Jordan et al. 2010; 
Koch and Schmidt 2009; Loewenstein, Cain, and Sah 2011; Monin and Miller 2001; Rose et al. 
2014).  However, there is scarce evidence about whether moral licensing affects the decisions of 
board members.  Rose et al. (2014) find that conflict of interest disclosures (i.e. friendship ties 
between CEOs and board members) license board members to make decisions favorable to the 
CEO. A key implication of their study is that, because of moral licensing, friendship ties impair 
directors’ independence and objectivity. The objective of our study is to investigate more 
generally whether moral licensing may also impair directors’ decisions even in the absence of 
friendship ties or independence issues. If disclosure of board members’ financial reporting-
related activities trigger the same reactions/behaviors as disclosure of conflict of interest 




Thus, our study provides evidence to conclude whether the effects of moral licensing on 
firms’ governance have broader implications than suggested by Rose et al. (2014) by considering 
the more likely case where the director is not impaired by friendship ties to a manager. This is 
important because it suggests that the impact of moral licensing on firms’ governance of 
financial reporting decisions may be more pervasive and commonplace than has been concluded 
by prior research.  Moreover, by examining the context of developing an accounting estimate 
where subjectivity is involved, we also address the possibility that directors invoke moral license 
because they can insulate their credibility and reputation when judgment is involved in the 
financial reporting matter. 
To test whether transparency of board member decisions biases their financial reporting-
related decisions, we conduct a 2 x 2 between-subjects experiment with practicing board 
members. We manipulate whether or not the board member’s decision is disclosed to the auditor 
(auditor disclosure requirement: present vs. absent) and to the public (public disclosure 
requirement: present vs. absent). Given the rise in and importance of fair value accounting 
judgments, we examine a context in which the board member must decide whether or not to 
approve a manager’s request to obtain an alternate fair value opinion when the original opinion 
received caused the company to miss an earnings target.3 Relying on moral licensing theory, we 
predict that board members who must either reject or approve a manager’s request to fair value 
opinion shop are more likely to approve the request when their approval decision is disclosed 
than when the approval is not disclosed. We also investigate whether different levels of 
                                                          
3 We chose a fair value judgment as the context because: 1) ambiguous decisions, such as those relating to estimates, 
“facilitate licensing effects by releasing constraints on temptation or reducing suspicion” (Mullen & Monin 2016); 
and 2) members of the board of directors are likely to be engaged for input on decisions that require subjectivity. 
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disclosure result in different licensing effects.  On the one hand, it is possible that increasing the 
amount of transparency increases board members’ sense of accountability and thus mitigates 
licensing effects.  On the other hand, it is possible that licensing effects are increasing in 
transparency, as board members feel even more licensed with greater transparency.   
 Consistent with moral licensing theory, we find that board members have a strong 
disclosure-induced proclivity to approve a manager’s request to fair value opinion shop, despite 
the fact that the approval biases the firm’s financial reporting in response to earnings pressures.4  
More specifically, a board member’s likelihood of approving a manager’s request to seek a 
second opinion is significantly higher in the presence of a requirement for transparent disclosure. 
We also investigate whether the amount of disclosure affects the degree to which board members 
feel licensed and find that there is no significant difference in board member decisions whether 
the decision is disclosed to just the auditor or whether it is disclosed to both the auditor and the 
public. An important implication of this finding is that if board members, including audit 
committees, are required to disclose their activities to auditors, disclosing these activities to the 
public as well may not result in any additional bias.  
In this study, we extend the disclosure literature in accounting – which has focused on the 
effects of disclosures on auditors and users – by examining how disclosing their governance-
related activities may affect board member judgments. This suggests that additional transparency 
via disclosure may not only provide information about the governance process, but also may 
change the governance decisions themselves – and not necessarily in a desirable way. In 
addition, we provide insights into the board member decision-making process using the rich data 
                                                          
4 We carefully built this in as a design feature of our study.  We told participants that the manager has received an 
opinion that fails to meet a target, but if they approve getting a second opinion the firm will meet that target.  This 
ensures that the board members are approving a request to buy a predetermined outcome. 
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set we were able to obtain. Very few studies have been able to capture the thoughts and feedback 
on the processes board members go through when making decisions. We provide insights on 
their thoughts regarding the use of fair value estimates and opinions received regarding those 
estimates. This information should be useful for users and regulators evaluating and looking to 
increase financial reporting quality. Finally, we extend prior literature that has investigated the 
presence versus absence of disclosure, by testing different levels of disclosure to provide initial 
evidence of the impact of different levels of disclosure on moral licensing effects.  
 The remainder of this study proceeds as follows.  Section 2 provides background and 
develops our hypotheses.  Section 3 describes the experimental design and methodology. 
Sections 4 reports the results, and Section 5 provides conclusions and implications. 
II. Background & Hypotheses Development 
Transparency through Disclosure 
A primary goal of the financial reporting process is to improve transparency through 
disclosure to inform the valuation and stewardship decisions of capital providers (Beyer, Cohen, 
Lys and Walther 2010).  Prior literature has demonstrated a number of benefits related to 
transparency in financial reporting, including greater analyst consensus, number of analysts that 
follow a firm, increased accuracy and reduced variability of forecasts (Lang and Lundholm 
1996), improved relation between returns and future earnings (Lundholm and Meyers 2002), and 
stock prices and cost of capital (Healy et al. 1999; Welker 1995).  Indeed, in response to greater 
demand from information consumers in recent years, regulators have used targeted transparency 
policies to address a broad array of issues, including the energy efficiency of appliances, lead-
based paint, genetically modified foods, and financial reporting. These policies seek to reduce 
information asymmetry, improve the decisions that individuals make, and modify the practices of 
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disclosers by aligning their incentives with regulator’s priorities (Fung, Graham and Weil 2007). 
Still, although there are benefits of targeted transparency policies, increased transparency via 
disclosure may also result in certain costs or unintended consequences. 
Moral Licensing and Disclosure 
The theory of moral licensing suggests that, under certain circumstances, transparency 
may actually produce the perverse effect of increasing bias in the information that is disclosed 
rather than the improving decision-making (Effron and Monin 2010; Koch and Schmidt 2010; 
Miller and Effron 2010; Merritt et al. 2012; Rose et al. 2014; Jamal, Marshall and Tan 2016). 
Moral licensing occurs when evidence of a person’s virtue frees (licenses) her or him to act less-
than-virtuously (Merritt and Monin 2010).5  Licensing effects have been shown in a number of 
domains, including advice giving, altruism, consumer behavior, racism, and sexism (Monin and 
Miller 2001; Cain et al. 2005; Khan and Dhar 2005; Koch and Schmidt 2009; Cain et al. 2010; 
Jordan et al. 2010; Loewenstein, Cain, and Sah 2011; Rose et al. 2014; Weibel, Messner and 
Brugger 2014). Prior literature has also documented numerous methods by which individuals 
develop a license, including good deeds, disclosure, reflecting on planned good deeds, and 
counterfactual reflection on prior transgressions (Jordan et al. 2010; Khan and Dhar 2005; 
Effron, Monin and Miller 2013).6  
                                                          
5 The literature has identified two different mechanisms underlying moral licensing, moral credits and moral 
credentials.  In the moral credits model is similar to a bank account where credits are earned and then used to 
balance out questionable behavior. According to Miller and Effron (2010), in the credentials model one’s behavioral 
history changes the way subsequent behavior is viewed.  For an in-depth discussion of the two mechanisms see 
Miller and Effron (2010). 
6 For example, Jordan et al. (2010) demonstrate that individuals who write about a time they helped somebody 
subsequently feel licensed to behave less altruistically. Khan and Dhar (2005) show that individuals who imagine 
volunteering for community service are subsequently more likely to purchase a hedonic item. Effron, Monin and 
Miller (2013) find that tempting individuals with desserts caused them to exaggerate the unhealthiness of desserts 
they had previously chosen not to eat. 
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Existing research relevant to financial reporting decisions primarily focuses on the 
licensing effects of conflict of interest disclosures, and concludes that disclosing a conflict of 
interest results in the following: 1) licenses more biased information, and 2) recipients of these 
disclosures fail to sufficiently discount the information provided by the conflicted advisors. For 
example, Rose et al. (2014) find that members of the board who disclose their friendship with a 
CEO (compared to those whose friendship is undisclosed) make deeper cuts to R&D in order to 
help the CEO earn a bonus. This suggests that conflict of interest disclosures may provide 
directors with a moral license to make a real earnings management decision with potentially 
negative long-term consequences.   
Moral licensing effects may persist in board of director decisions about financial 
reporting, however, even in the absence of conflict of interest. Research has demonstrated that 
auditors view disclosure as a partial substitute for financial statement recognition (Griffin 2014).  
It is possible that board members view transparency via disclosure similarly and more broadly as 
a means to insulate their reputation when estimation uncertainty exists – not just for conflicts of 
interest. For example, if presented with a request to approve a second fair value opinion, board 
members likely understand/agree that fair value opinion shopping (seeking a second fair value 
opinion for the sole purpose of meeting an earnings target) results in more biased financial 
reporting. However, they may be more likely to approve such a request from management if it is 
transparent – or disclosed. Indeed, this is a particularly appealing option for the board member 
when the second fair value opinion produces benefits such as in the case of meeting an earnings 
target because it is easier to justify that shareholder value increases and the decision is 
transparent for decision-makers using that information. As such, we predict that board members 
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would be more likely to approve a manager’s request for a revised fair value estimate when the 
approval decision is disclosed. Our first hypothesis is stated as follows: 
Hypothesis 1: Board members are more likely to approve a manager’s request for a 
revised fair value estimate when their approval decision is disclosed than when the 
decision is not disclosed.   
Our second hypothesis investigates whether the level of disclosure affects the degree to 
which board members feel licensed.  Given the significant demand for increased transparency in 
recent years, both the PCOAB and the SEC have engaged in efforts to increase transparency 
from board members – and particularly audit committees overseeing the financial reporting 
function – to both the auditor and the public, respectively. As a result, it is possible that 
upcoming changes in disclosure requirements could impact the level of transparency to the 
auditor (through PCAOB driven regulatory changes), or to both the auditor and the public 
(through SEC driven regulatory changes). Consequently, understanding the impact of different 
levels of disclosure and the resulting licensing effects may be particularly useful to such 
regulatory efforts. Although prior literature has varied disclosure dichotomously (i.e., presence 
versus absence) and has consistently found that the presence of disclosure can license individuals 
to make biased decisions, academic researchers have not considered the effect of different levels 
of disclosure.  It is possible that disclosure to more parties may lead to less biased board member 
decisions by increasing a sense of accountability or increasing the extent to which they feel their 
decisions may be scrutinized/second-guessed.  In contrast, it is possible that disclosure to more 
parties could provide a stronger license and lead to more biased decisions by directors. As such, 
our second hypothesis is stated as follows in the null form: 
Hypothesis 2: Board members are no more likely to approve a manager’s request for a 
revised fair value estimate when their approval decision is disclosed to both the public 
and the auditor as compared to when the decision is just disclosed to the auditor.  
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III. Experimental Design & Methodology 
Participants 
 Participants were identified using the Corporate Affiliations web platform complied by 
the LexisNexis Enterprise Entity Management Group.  From the population of active board 
members identified, 2,500 were randomly selected to receive experimental materials.  Of the 
2,500 instruments mailed out, 115 were returned as undeliverable.  Of the 2,385 instruments that 
presumably reached their intended recipients, a total of 167 individuals responded, which 
represents a 7.0 percent response rate.  Of those that responded, 10 either had a policy against 
completing experiments or chose not to complete the materials, resulting in 157 completed 
experiments. The mean (median) age of participants is 58.0 (57.4) years, and the mean (median) 
years of board experience is 15.6 (13.5). 
Task and instrument 
 Participants were asked to assume the role of a board member of a hypothetical company, 
CGC Corporation.  They were informed that a new company policy requires the board to 
approve contracts for certain professional business services. Next, participants learn that a 
manager of the hypothetical company obtained a fair value estimate from an external valuation 
professional and, after factoring the fair value estimate into the preliminary financial statements, 
the company will miss a financial target.  Participants were also informed that shareholders will 
not obtain certain benefits if the company misses the target.  Finally, participants learn that (a) 
the manager is requesting approval to seek another fair value opinion from a different valuation 
professional, and (b) if the manager’s request is approved, the company will meet its financial 
target and shareholders will obtain certain benefits.   
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The first manipulated variable, auditor disclosure, informs participants that their approval 
decision will or will not be provided to the external auditor.  The second manipulated variable, 
public disclosure, informs participants that their approval decision will or will not be provided to 
the public.7  Participants then indicate whether they reject or approve the manager’s request to 
seek a second fair value opinion from a different valuation professional.  The dependent variable, 
participants’ response to the manager’s request to seek a second fair value opinion, is measured 
on a 10-point scale ranging from -5 (reject) to 5 (approve). After responding to the dependent 
measure, participants answered demographic and other explanatory questions. 
IV. Results 
Panel A of Table 2 provides means and standard deviations of board members’ likelihood 
of approving or rejecting a manager’s request to seek a second fair value opinion in each of the 
treatment conditions.  The overall mean of -0.99 is statistically lower than the midpoint of 0.00 
(p-value < 0.01), suggesting that, on average, boards are reluctant to approve managers’ requests 
to seek a second fair value opinion.  Hypothesis 1 predicts that disclosure will provide a moral 
license such that board members will make more biased financial reporting decisions when the 
decision is disclosed compared to when the decision is not disclosed. In the context of our 
experiment, this suggests that boards are more likely to approve seeking a second opinion when it 
is transparent – i.e., disclosed to either the auditor and/or the public.   
                                                          
7 Two manipulation checks were included in the experiment. The manipulation checks focused on (1) the presence 
(absence) of a requirement to disclose board approval to the auditor, and (2) the presence (absence) of a requirement 
to disclose board approval to the public.  Eighty six percent answered the first manipulation check correctly, while 
89 percent answered the second manipulation check correctly.  All participants were used in the analysis.  The 
inferences and conclusions of this experiment are unaffected by excluding participants who incorrectly responded to 
any of the manipulation checks.   
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Panel B of Table 2 presents ANOVA results highlighting the impact of disclosure on 
board member decisions. Consistent with Hypothesis 1, we find significant effects of both 
disclosure to the auditor (F-statistic = 5.57, p-value < 0.01) and the public (F-statistic = 6.37, p-
value < 0.01).  Given Hypothesis 1 specifies a particular pattern of means, we formally test this 
hypothesis using planned comparisons (Buckless and Ravenscroft 1990; Rosenthal and Rosnow 
2008).  Panel C of Table 2 presents the results of our comparison of the likelihood of approval in 
the condition absent disclosure to each of the three conditions that require disclosure.  Consistent 
with the theory of moral licensing and Hypothesis 1, a board member’s likelihood of approving a 
manager’s request to seek a second opinion is significantly higher in the presence of a 
requirement for transparent disclosure (t = 5.87, p-value < 0.01).  Thus, we find support for 
Hypothesis 1.    
Our second Hypothesis investigates whether the level of disclosure affects the degree to 
which board members feel licensed. To test this hypothesis, we compare the condition where 
disclosure to the auditor is present and disclosure to the public is absent to the condition where 
disclosure is required to both parties. The results of this comparison in Panel D of Table 2 
suggest no significant difference between these two conditions (t = 1.17, p-value = 0.24).  Thus, 
we are unable to reject the null and Hypothesis 2 is supported – we find no significant difference 
in the likelihood of the board member’s approval decision when the decision is disclosed to both 
the public and the auditor as compared to when the decision is just disclosed to the auditor.  
V. Conclusions & Implications 
 Market participants continue to demand greater disclosure from boards of directors, yet 
little is known about the effect of these disclosures on board member decisions.  We extend prior 
literature, which has examined conflict of interest disclosures, and provide evidence about 
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whether requiring disclosure of boards decisions licenses board members to make more biased 
decisions.  Our results reveal that disclosure can license board members to make biased decisions 
that they may otherwise not make in the absence of disclosure.  However, we find no evidence 
that increasing the level of disclosure (disclosure to the auditor versus disclosure to the auditor 
and public) had an impact beyond a base level of disclosure.  The implication of these findings, 
relevant to current projects at both the PCAOB and the SEC, is that increased disclosure of board 
member decisions may carry with it unintended consequences – including increased bias in 
financial reporting. The knowledge gained form this study may help to improve regulations 
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 TABLE 1: Demographics in Years 
Age Average Median Min Max 
Average 57.4 58.0 26.0 84.0 
Total Board Experience     
Average 15.6 13.5 1.0 52.0 
Public Board Experience   
   
Average 7.0 4.8 0.0 39.0 
Private Board Experience   
   






TABLE 2: Board Experiment  
Panel A: Board Member’s Approval/Reject Decisions  
 
  AUDITOR 
PUBLIC  Yes No Average 
 
Yes 
Mean 0.13 -0.74 -0.27 
St. dev. 3.95 3.37 3.70 
 N 45 38 83 
    
 
No 
Mean -0.83 -2.74 -1.81 
St. dev. 4.01 3.24 3.73 
 N 36 38 74 
 
    
Mean -0.30 -1.74 -0.99 
Average St. dev. 3.98 3.43 3.76 
N 81 76 157 
     
 
Panel B: ANOVA 
 
Source DF Mean Square F p-Value 
Public disclosure 1 85.75 6.37 <0.01* 
Auditor disclosure 1 74.96 5.57 <0.01* 
Public disclosure × Audit disclosure 1 10.40 0.77 0.19* 
Residual 1 13.46   
 
Panel C:  Tests of contrast 
 
Hypothesized Contrast t p-Value 
When deciding to approve or reject a manager’s request to obtain a second fair 
value opinion, a requirement to disclose the board’s decision to the public, to 
the auditor, or both will increase the board’s likelihood of approval (contrast 
weights are +3, -1, -1, -1) 
5.87 <0.01* 
 
Panel D:  Tests of Hypothesis 2 
 
Hypothesized Comparison t p-Value 
When deciding to approve or reject a manager’s request to obtain a second fair 
value opinion, there will be no difference in the likelihood of approval when 
the decision is disclosed to both the public and the auditor as compared to 
when the decision is just disclosed to the auditor. 
1.17 0.24 
 
 
